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The aim of this paper is to investigate the infl uence of fi scal rules on the budgetary outcomes in 
27 European Union countries. In particular, the paper focuses on assessing whether the impact of 
fi scal rules is statistically signifi cant and numerically meaningful. In order to assess the infl uence, 
we use a dynamic panel data model. In our baseline model, we introduce the fi scal rule index as an 
explanatory variable. Our estimation rests on the fi scal reaction function. The analysis shows that 
the fi scal rule index positively affects the cyclically-adjusted primary balance and the cyclically-
adjusted balance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wider attention has been paid to aspects of fiscal policy. This special 
interest in fiscal policy is the result of severe economic turbulences and the need 
for government interventions in order to mitigate recession. Fiscal policy in the 
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European Union (EU) is conducted at the country-specific level. Each country 
imposes its own numerical domestic rules in order to ensure the stability of public 
finances. But owing to real and potential problems with the maintenance of pub-
lic finance discipline, European institutions, concerned with ensuring the proper 
functioning of the euro area, have imposed supranational rules. Those rules focus 
on maintaining fiscal discipline and conducting fiscal policy in an appropriate 
manner. 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether numerical fiscal policy rules 
have a real impact. Our aim is to determine whether the influence of numerical 
fiscal constraints is statistically significant. 
The main idea of this paper is to check the influence of fiscal rules on gen-
eral government indicators. In order to do this, we employ a dynamic panel data 
model with the fiscal rule index as an explanatory variable. Next, we construct 
some regressions and try to determine the extent of the influence of this index on 
selected fiscal policy variables. Our approach is based on the fiscal reaction func-
tion. We work with 27 EU countries.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature. It especial-
ly emphasises the role of selected fiscal rules in assessment of the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy. Section 3 describes the data, methodology, and provides estimation 
outcomes and robustness check results. Section 4 provides conclusions. 
2. FISCAL RULES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON BUDGETARY OUTCOMES – 
LITERATURE REVIEW
A common definition of fiscal policy rules emphasises their permanent constraint 
on fiscal aggregates through simple numerical limits (Kopits – Symansky 1998). 
Fiscal rules are statutory or constitutional restrictions on fiscal policy, which en-
sure a specific limit on fiscal indicators such as the budgetary balance, government 
debt, government spending, or revenues (Kennedy et al. 2001). In this sense, fis-
cal rules are guidelines for maintaining fiscal discipline. Rules may be treated as 
permanent components of budgetary institutions (Alesina – Perotti 1999). Fiscal 
constraints constitute important institutional aspects; therefore, they may create 
a framework for conducting fiscal policy and for controlling public finance in a 
broader sense. Because fiscal rules are a certain institutional mechanism, they 
support fiscal discipline and credibility (IMF 2009). 
The construction of fiscal rules should allow for maintaining stability in pub-
lic finances. As Balassone – Franco (2001) emphasise, fiscal rules create certain 
margins for budgetary flexibility in “bad times”. The main reasons for implement-
ing fiscal rules are to ensure macroeconomic stability, take actions to reduce ex-
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cessive deficit, enhance fiscal policy credibility, minimise negative externalities 
within international arrangements, and ensure fiscal sustainability (Kennedy et al. 
2001). The IMF report (2009) presents three main objectives of fiscal rules (debt 
sustainability, government size, and economic stabilisation) and tries to assess the 
effectiveness and correlation of selected fiscal rules with specified goals. 
Based on US data, Poterba (1994) argues that fiscal institutions and political 
factors play an important role in creating short-run deficit dynamics. Generally, 
the stronger the rules, the larger the government surplus or the lower the deficit 
(Bayoumi – Eichengreen 1995; Alesina – Bayoumi 1996). According to Fatas – 
Mihov’s evidence (2006), fiscal policy in the US is a source of business cycle 
volatility, thus restricting fiscal policy leads to improvement in macroeconomic 
stability. Favero – Monacelli (2005) estimate regime-switching fiscal rules on the 
basis of the Markov-switching regression. According to them, the fiscal policy 
regime in the US can be described in terms of systematic rules and they empiri-
cally identify two fiscal regimes in the US. What’s more, these authors empha-
sise that regime switches, in both fiscal and monetary policy, do not display any 
degree of synchronisation. The studies by Eichengreen – Bayoumi (1994) and 
Hallerberg – Wolff (2008) show the impact of the fiscal institutional framework 
on government bond yields.
Gali – Perotti (2003) conclude that discretionary fiscal policy in EMU has 
become more counter-cyclical over time. The analysis of the rules’ implementa-
tion (the Stability and Growth Pact and the Maastricht Treaty) does not support 
the view that fiscal rules in EMU countries stabilise fiscal policy more than in 
non-EMU countries. However, fiscal arrangements contributed to more disci-
plined public finances. Buti et al. (2003) analyse the properties of the Stability 
and Growth Pact in the context of European fiscal rules. The fundamentals of 
designing supranational fiscal rules in the EU and the theoretical context of fiscal 
constraint requirements are presented in Buti – van den Noord (2004). However, 
euro area membership can generate external effects (moral hazard and free riding 
problems) due to a lack of discipline in public finances, resulting in high deficits 
(see de Grauwe 2000; Buti – Franco 2005 for details). What’s more, countries 
may exhibit internal fiscal rule avoidance, which leads to creative accounting and 
problems with budgetary discipline. For example, a brief history of the develop-
ment of the Greek fiscal crisis is presented by Kaplanoglou – Rapanos (2011), 
who emphasise the weak institutional framework as the main source of the coun-
try’s turbulences. Thus, appropriate fiscal institutions are one of the most impor-
tant aspects determining the effectiveness of fiscal rules (Wyplosz 2012).
Turrini (2008) analyses the behaviour of fiscal policy in 10 euro zone countries 
by using separate fiscal reaction functions. He points out that fiscal policy gener-
ates a pro-cyclical bias in good times, which is shaped by the expenditure side 
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of the budget. Thus, expenditure rules are perceived as a tool that prevents the 
escalation of the expenditure side of the budget. Deroose et al. (2006) find a sta-
tistically significant influence of the expenditure rule index on expenditure out-
comes. Wierts (2008a) tries to assess the position of national expenditure rules in 
reducing expenditure bias, based on the example of 15 European Union countries 
during 1998–2005. According to his study, a higher institutional strength of ex-
penditure rules leads to more neutral responses of revenue shocks. Holm-Hadulla 
et al. (2010) focus on the effects of expenditure rules on government spending 
behaviours. Their analysis (European Union countries during years 2002–2008) 
shows a pro-cyclical nature of government expenditures in reaction to unexpected 
changes in the output gap. Their research shows that spending with a high level 
of budgetary flexibility generates a higher pro-cyclical bias. It should be noted 
that expenditure rules generate maximal counter-cyclicality, when the target is 
expressed in nominal terms, but when the target is defined as a GDP ratio, it may 
entail a pro-cyclical bias (Ayuso-i-Casals 2012).
Bohn – Inman (1996) state that balanced budget rules increase the average 
budget balance, i.e. they reduce the propensity to generate deficit. Inman (1996) 
draws attention to the effectiveness and adequate construction of the balanced 
budget rule. Generally, fiscal rules (in the form of European arrangements) lead 
to an increase in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance and support fiscal dis-
cipline (Debrun et al. 2008; Afonso – Hauptmeier 2009). In other words, fiscal 
rules improve the discretionary position of fiscal policy due to numerical con-
straints and increase in structural surplus. 
It should be mentioned that fiscal rules also face criticism. Rules may en-
courage pro-cyclical fiscal policy or may encourage creative accounting, which 
reduces the overall transparency of the budget (Debrun et al. 2008). However, 
the existence of fiscal rules and their combination with an appropriate monetary 
policy ensure macroeconomic stabilisation. As Combes et al. (2014) emphasise, 
the combination of inflation targeting (with monetary policy rule) and fiscal rules 
seems to provide more disciplined macroeconomic policies than each of these 
institutions operating separately. Both institutions have a positive impact on fis-
cal performance and inflation. The effect of these two rule-based policies is an 
improvement in macroeconomic outcomes.
The recent debate has focused on optimal fiscal rules. The features of an ide-
al fiscal rule are specified by Inman (1996), Kopits – Symansky (1998), Kopits 
(2001), Kell (2001), Wyplosz (2002), Buiter (2003), Buiter – Grafe (2004), Em-
merson et al. (2004), and Birashi (2008), who focus mainly on the “ideal” institu-
tional aspects of fiscal rules. The problem of the optimal fiscal rule and its optimal 
combination with monetary policy rule is emphasised by Schmitt-Grohe – Uribe 
(2004, 2007). The latter study focuses on optimal and simple feedback rules, 
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which are determined by maximising a second-order welfare approximation of 
the analysed model. The assessment of the optimal fiscal policy rule in EMU, in 
the context of a microfounded New Keynesian model, is discussed by Kirsanova 
et al. (2007). According to this study, the gains from fiscal stabilisation are very 
significant in a monetary union. Their paper emphasises the meaning of fiscal 
restrictions for better managing the euro area. However, as Mihályi (2011) points 
out, the difficulties in hardening the soft budget constraint mechanism exist in the 
euro zone and the appropriate reforms of the governance system are weakened.
The causality between fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes is a separate issue. Ac-
cording to OECD (2013), this relationship has been weak, especially after 2008, 
i.e. during the crisis and in post-crisis times. On the other hand, it is possible 
to observe a reverse causality – where performance determines rules – when 
countries with a potential high impact of fiscal institutions on policy reveal their 
strong preferences by adopting strengthened institutions (IMF 2013). Debrun – 
Kumar (2007) argue that reverse causality may bias the quantitative analysis of 
the impact of institutions on outcomes because fiscal institutions may be time-
inconsistent and perform in the following way: “from good outcomes to good 
institutions”. The authors confirmed the evidence of an endogeneity bias in ana-
lysing the causality of rules on fiscal outcomes. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION
3.1. Data description 
Our sample consists of annual data and covers the period from 2000 to 2012 
for 27 European Union member states. Croatia was omitted due the lack of 
a complete data set. The fiscal data were derived from the AMECO database 
and Eurostat. General consolidated gross debt is presented as a GDP ratio. The 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and cyclically-adjusted balance 
(CAB) are presented as a percentage of trend GDP. The output gap was com-
puted on the basis of HP filter and by using the Eurostat data (real GDP, refer-
ence year 2005). 
Data related to the fiscal rule index came from the official database of the 
Euro pean Commission. The fiscal rule index (henceforth FRI) is a standardised 
and time-varying measure constructed and calculated by the European Commis-
sion itself. This measure is based on information collected in a special survey 
filled in by member states. The questionnaire deals with the definition of each 
implemented rule, its description, and coverage. The FRI is calculated on the 
basis of the so-called fiscal rule strength index (FRSI), which takes into account 
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five criteria: the statutory/legal basis of the rule, the mechanisms for monitor-
ing the rule’s compliance and enforcement, the room for revising objectives, the 
existence of pre-defined enforcement mechanism, and the media visibility of the 
rule.1 Table 1 presents selected descriptive statistics of our dataset.
3.2. Methodology
In order to assess the effects of fiscal rules on the behaviour of fiscal variables, 
we employ an approach based on the fiscal reaction function (Bohn 1998). Our 
aim is to check whether the parameters related to the fiscal rule index have a sta-
tistically significant influence on the dependent variables included in estimated 
equations. We use panel data due to the short sample of our countries. 
Our work was inspired by the European Commission’s (2009, 2006) study 
extending the fiscal reaction function by the presence of the index for fiscal rules. 
The European Commission approach (2009) was to estimate the model by us-
ing fixed effects. In contrast, Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) used a two-stage least 
squares estimation including country- and time-fixed effects. Afonso – Guimarães 
(2014) also estimated the fiscal reaction function by using the fixed effects OLS 
regressions and the 2SLS estimator. On the other hand, Golinelli – Momigliano 
(2008) extended the standard equation of the fiscal reaction function by the pres-
ence of the so-called CAPB/PB model. Wierts (2008b) included a review of esti-
mates of the fiscal reaction function for individual countries and group of coun-
tries (panel data). He concluded that according to the studies of Judson – Owen 
(1999) and Galí – Perotti (2003), it is possible to estimate the fiscal reaction 
function with least squares dummy variables that perform just as well as the other 
available estimators, including GMM estimation. 
1  Detailed information about the construction of the European fiscal rule index is presented, 
e.g., in European Commission (2006), Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obser.
CAB (cyclically-adjusted balance) –3.03 5.82 –28.27 3.75 351
CAPB (cyclically-adjusted primary balance) –0.60 9.20 –25.13 3.62 351
DEBT (public debt) 52.41 170.31 3.69 29.83 351
FRI (fiscal rule index) 0.44 3.26 –1.01 0.99 351
GAP (output gap) 0.06 10.01 –11.68 3.75 351
Source: Author’s own calculation.
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Indeed, we derived our equation from the European Commission (2009). 
However, we decided to use one of the methods of dynamic panel data estimation 
because in our estimated equation, we have a lagged dependent variable. Because 
the proposed equation of the fiscal reaction function is a dynamic equation, the 
standard fixed effects estimator is biased and inconsistent.2 Thus, even if it is pos-
sible to use the least squares dummy variable estimator as suggested by Judson 
– Owen (1999), in order to deal with this bias, we use GMM estimation in our 
baseline specification. Our baseline approach is to use the system-GMM instead 
of the first-differenced GMM by Arellano – Bond (1991) because our datasets 
include a small range of periods and, what is more, the number of panels is higher 
than the number of periods (i.e. 27 countries and only 13 years). The estimator 
includes extra lagged differenced variables as instruments in the level equations, 
thus it may generate substantial efficiency gains when the time sample (length) is 
relatively short. The system estimator was developed by Blundell – Bond (1998) 
who, based on the work of Arellano – Bover (1995), introduced additional mo-
ment conditions. This estimator improves the precision in relation to the differ-
enced GMM by Arellano – Bond (1991), but also reduces the finite sample bias 
(see Blundell et al. 2000). We decided to employ the system-GMM estimator for 
our baseline estimations; however, the alternative dynamic panel data estimators 
and other panel data estimators are used for robustness check.
In our model, we decide to employ the system two-step GMM estimator rather 
than the one-step estimator. Our approach is based on Windmeijer’s (2005) infer-
ences, whose correction procedure of the system two-step GMM estimator gen-
erates an increase in precision in comparison to both the system one-step GMM 
estimator and the two-step first-differenced GMM estimator by Arellano – Bond 
(1991). 
The general dynamic panel data equation of our model is as follows:
yi,t = α0 + α1 + γ1 yi,t–1 + β1 FRIi,t + β2 GAPi,t–1 + β3 DEBTi,t–1 + β4 xi,t + ξi,t
where:
yi,t  is the dependent fiscal variable in country i in time t,
FRIi,t is the fiscal rule index in country i in time t,
GAPi,t–1 is the lagged output gap (percentage of trend GDP) in country i in time 
t–1,
DEBTi,t–1 is the lagged debt (in relation to nominal GDP) in country i in time t–1,
2  According to the observations of, e.g., Nickell (1981), the OLS estimates of the lagged 
dependent variable’s coefficient in a dynamic panel model are biased due to the correlation 
between the fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable.
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xi,t is the set of other control variables in country i in time t,
α1 is the country-specific fixed effects,
γ1, β1, β2, β3, β4 are the parameters of the model, and
ξi,t is the error term.
We extend the European Commission’s approach by including the additional 
set of variables and changing the method of estimation. As a result, we built a 
baseline equation that shows the response of the cyclically-adjusted primary bal-
ance (CAPB) to (i) the lagged dependent variable, (ii) the fiscal rule index, i.e. the 
level of fiscal constraints, (iii) the lagged debt, (iv) the cyclical fluctuations pre-
sented by the size of the lagged output gap, (v) the impact of elections (dummy 
variable), and (vi) the dummy variable for Ireland in 2010. 
We concentrate on the cyclically-adjusted primary balance because our in-
tention is to check the influence of the FRI on strict fiscal policy discretionary 
measures. In our baseline estimation, we would like to avoid the analysis of the 
influence of rules on the cyclical components of the budget balance, which are 
generated by automatic stabilisers. Our special interest is the β1 parameter, which 
investigates the impact of the fiscal rule index on the dependent variable in the 
current period.3
We decided to use the lagged output gap (GAPi,t–1) instead of the current output 
gap (GAPi,t) because we incorporate the fact that it takes some time for fiscal 
policy to react to changes in economic activity. So, in our opinion, the lagged 
output gap has a wider influence on the behaviour of fiscal variables than the cur-
rent development of economic activity. 
In our model, we include a special dummy variable, ir2010, which describes the 
large outlier in our dataset for Ireland in 2010. In 2010, the situation in public fi-
nances was the worst in Ireland in the European Union (i.e. the deficit was higher 
than 30% of GDP and the ratio of CAPB to GDP was about 25.1%). 
In our analysis, we include the impact of parliamentary elections ELEp (i.e. 
elections for parliamentary chambers) on structural balance (we omit presidential 
elections, senate elections, or referendums). This dummy variable equals 1 in the 
election year and 0 otherwise. The information covering the dates of the chamber 
elections comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union database. 
3  We use the F-test for investigating whether the coefficients are the same (specification based 
on panel IV fixed effects approach); in fact, we test the existence of a homogenous panel. We 
reject null in both cases and investigate the need for introducing individual effects (units). This 
means that an individual effect obtains its own intercept, while the slope coefficients are the 
same (results not reported here).
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3.3. Results for the baseline model
In our baseline equation, which includes the entire sample, the estimated param-
eter measuring the influence of the FRI on the CAPB is consistent with our intui-
tion, but is not statistically significant. The initial results are included in column I 
of Table 2. The influence of the numerical fiscal rule index on the CAPB is posi-
tive, which means that an increase in the value of the FRI results in an increase in 
the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. Generally, an increase in the FRI results 
in the improvement of a country’s budgetary balance, and increases the structural 
surplus. The model shows the negative impact of the output gap on the CAPB. 
Also, the dummy variable for Ireland is found to be significant for our estimation. 
The analysis of the dataset suggests that, probably, our outcome is an effect of the 
range of the sample and problems with proper estimation. Thus, we decided to 
change the range of the sample and re-estimate our model.
Our results are quite similar to the estimations prepared by the European Com-
mission (2009), which uses the OLS with time- and country-fixed effects (het-
eroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clusters standard errors). The European 
Commission (2009) dataset for 27 EU countries during 1990–2008 estimates the 
parameter measuring the influence of the FRI on the CAPB as 0.48 (note, that in 
our study we were not able to find a statistically significant impact of the FRI on 
the CAPB for the whole sample). 
Before 2004, 12 of the analysed countries were outside the European Union. 
Ten countries acceded in 2004 and two in 2007. In order to check whether the 
enlargement in 2004 had an influence on fiscal policy in the European Union as a 
whole, we shorten our sample. The results are presented in column II of Table 2. 
The estimated average influence of the FRI on the CAPB is quantitatively larger. 
After 2004, the analysed countries paid greater attention to maintaining the fis-
cal constraints guaranteed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. During the years 2004–2012, an increase in the FRI by one unit results in 
the improvement of the CAPB to GDP ratio by an average of 0.73 percentage 
points. Our goal was also to compute the influence of the crisis on the perform-
ance of the FRI. Unfortunately, we were not able to get satisfactory and correct 
estimations, probably due to the short sample of our dataset and problems with 
the Sargan test (results not reported here).
In columns III–V of Table 2, we present the results for the cyclically-adjusted 
balance (CAB) as a dependent variable. Intrigued by the relatively low impact of 
the FRI on the CAPB, we decided to compare those results with outcomes from 
the dynamic panel data, with the CAB as a dependent variable. This variant of the 
analyses of the influence of the FRI is larger than in the previous approach (com-
pare the results in columns I–II and III–V). Since 2004, an increase of FRI by one 
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unit has resulted in an average increase of the cyclically-adjusted balance to GDP 
ratio by 0.89 percentage points. We find a positive and statistically significant im-
pact of the FRI on the CAB since 2007. According to our results, the increase of 
FRI by one unit has resulted in the average increase of the CAB by 1.01 percent-
age points. It means that during the crisis, fiscal constraints played an important 
role in public finances. Unfortunately, we are not able to find the similar relation 
for the CAPB. Our results show that the impact of the FRI is numerically more 
meaningful when the dependent variable is the CAB rather than the CAPB. 
Table 2. Baseline estimates of the fiscal reaction function for CAPB and CAB
CAPB CAB
I II III IV V
const. –2.547***(0.647)
–2.927***
 (0.747)
–2.682***
(0.763)
–3.146***
(0.712)
–3.585***
(1.129)
dep.vari,t–1
0.609***
(0.110)
0.570***
 (0.137)
0.541***
(0.084)
0.560***
(0.120)
0.555***
(0.154)
FRIi,t
0.429
(0.375)
0.729*
(0.424)
0.719***
(0.271)
0.894***
(0.324)
1.014**
(0.499)
GAPi,t–1
–0.173***
(0.056)
–0.162*
 (0.087)
–0.184***
(0.057)
–0.179**
(0.079)
–0.148**
(0.068)
DEBTi,t–1
0.043***
(0.011)
0.045***
 (0.015)
0.025**
(0.012)
0.030**
(0.012)
0.032**
(0.0144)
ir2010
–22.574***
(5.034)
–20.139***
(0.861)
–26.881***
(5.988)
–21.521***
(1.540)
–21.673***
(1.996)
ELEp
–0.565*
(0.342)
–0.645**
(0.325)
–0.560**
(0.239)
–0.567
(0.347)
–0.530
(0.326)
countries (no.) 27
observations 350 243 350 243 162
period 2000–2012 2004–2012 2000–2012 2004–2012 2007–2012
Sargan test statistic 24.791 22.432 20.364 19.939 15.478
p-value 0.474 0.169 0.728 0.277 0.162
AR1-statsistic –2.980 –2.515 –3.112 –2.624 –2.045
p-value 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.009 0.041
AR2-statistic –0.252 –0.716 –0.416 –0.864 –0.932
p-value 0.801 0.474 0.678 0.387 0.351
instruments (no.) 32 24 32 24 18
Note: The robust standard error values are presented in parentheses. AR1 and AR2 denote the values 
of the statistic for the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. The Sargan statistic denotes the 
value of the Sargan test of over-identifying conditions, which value is computed using GMM-
type of standard error. Signs *, **, *** denote signifi cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.
Source: Author’s own calculation.
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The impact of the dummy variable for Ireland on our average outcomes is 
significant and relatively large. Because of the situation in Ireland in 2010, the 
average structural balance in that country was lower by more than 20 percentage 
points in comparison to the other periods and countries. We observe the statisti-
cally significant impact of parliamentary elections on the CAPB. For example, 
during years 2000–2012, the impact of this type of elections reduced the cyclical-
ly-adjusted primary balance by 0.565 percentage points on average in compari-
son to the years without this type of elections. When we shorten the sample, the 
impact is larger. In accordance with our outcomes, the impact of parliamentary 
elections on the cyclically-adjusted balance is statistically significant only over 
the 2000–2012 period. When we shorten the sample, we are not able to receive 
the statistically significant reaction. 
Our estimates suggest a negative and statistically significant impact of the 
lagged output gap on both the cyclically-adjusted primary balance and cyclically-
adjusted balance. Thus, the outcomes highlight the pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal 
policy, on average, in 27 EU states. However, the presence of strong fiscal con-
straints, both national and supranational, enforces the discipline in public finance. 
But, the negative impact of the output gap on structural balance is decreased when 
we shortened the sample. Probably, it is the effect of the better performance of the 
automatic stabilisers in the EU. On the other hand, the average impact of lagged 
debt on structural surplus is positive, but very low. 
3.4. Extensions and robustness checks
Now we extend our analysis with a set of variables and use different methods of 
estimation to check for robustness. We employ additional variables and use extra 
lags of variables included in the baseline specification for the fiscal reaction func-
tion. The examples of model estimations are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 presents the results for our baseline model obtained by employing al-
ternative methods of estimation. Our finding is that the impact of the FRI on the 
CAPB is not statistically significant for the full sample (2000–2012) in different 
methods of estimation. In our analysis, we use alternative estimators for robust-
ness check, including the pooled OLS, LSDV (country fixed-effects) with robust 
standard errors, IV estimator (2SLS estimation in which the lagged output gap 
variable is instrumented using its own lag and exogenous variables), the GMM 
estimator (two-step Arellano-Bond’s dynamic panel estimator), and bias correct-
ed fixed effects estimator. These estimators are often used in similar studies for 
robustness checks (e.g. Judson – Owen 1999 and Afonso – Guimarães 2014). The 
impact of the FRI on the CAB is robust for the whole sample and all analysed 
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alternative estimators (we are able to observe a statistically significant relation-
ship). Moreover, the impact of the lagged output gap and lagged debt variable on 
the CAPB is not statistically significant in the Arellano-Bond estimator.
Next, we extended the study and introduced additional dummy variables to 
broaden our analysis. We checked other specifications as robustness checks. To 
simplify our analysis, we used the baseline two-step system-GMM estimator in 
all cases, except for the subsample (2004–2012) and provided estimates for the 
CAPB as a dependent variable.
We employed additional dummy variable data called ELEp to express the im-
pact of all types of elections (both early elections, and “normal” elections cover-
ing parliamentary elections, presidential elections, referendums, and elections to 
the European Parliament).4 The new variable (ELE) has a larger range than the 
previous variable (ELEp). According to our results, when we replace the ELEp 
dummy variable with a new variable measuring the impact of all types of elec-
tions (ELE), the influence of this dummy on the CAPB proved statistically insig-
nificant. In specification with the ELEp dummy variable, the impact of the FRI 
on the CAPB is also statistically insignificant.
In our baseline specification, Ireland proved to be an outlier due to the effect of 
the bank bailout. Therefore, we tried to examine the impact of another country’s 
bailout examples on its public finance. During the analysed period, bank bailouts 
occurred in a few European countries. The scale of the bailouts should have had 
an impact on public finance. Therefore, we included additional dummy variables 
for implementing selected large-scale bailouts: Greece (grb_o – a dummy variable 
for 2010 and 2012), Portugal pob_o – dummy variable for 2011), and Spain (esb_o – 
dummy variable for 2012).5 Surprisingly, the impact of the dummy variables for 
bailout years in Portugal turned out positive. 
It should be noted that in 2010, the situation in public finances in most EU 
countries was difficult, thus we included the dummy variable year2010 to reflect 
this specific year. According to our results, in 2010, in comparison to other ob-
servations in our time window, the CAPB in analysed countries was lower on 
average by 2.18 percentage points. 
We also tried to examine the effect of money markets on public finance. Thus, we 
included additional variables in order to check the impact of the money market on 
public finance: rstiri,t, short term real interest rate, and rltiri,t, long term real interest 
rate. These variables had a positive impact on the CAPB, but in many cases, the impact 
was not statistically significant (most estimations are not presented in this paper). 
4 Data for elections in European countries were derived from the European Election Database.
5  Data on the times of bailouts were derived from the information published on the IMF 
website.
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Table 4. Robustness checks for baseline system-GMM estimator
CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB
I II III IV V VI VII
const. –2.061***  (0.705)
–2.689***
  (0.618)
–2.920***
(0.792)
–2.866***
(0.735)
–2.881***
(0.720)
–3.040***
(0.835)
–2.247 
(0.653)
dep.vati,t–1
0.491***
 (0.124)
0.502***
 (0.122)
0.507***
(0.132)
0.562***
(0.132)
0.564***
(0.126)
0.578***
(0.152)
0.453***
   (0.073)
FRIi,t
0.764**
 (0.376)
0.771**
    (0.383)
0.703 
(0.561)
0.621  
(0.463)
0.754*
(0.455)
0.696 
(0.436)
FRIi,t–1
0.359 
(0.661)
0.696*
(0.392)
FRIi,t–2
0.045 
(0.237)
GAPi,t
–0.098 
(0.060)
GAPi,t–1
–0.093  
 (0.070)
–0.145*
 (0.081)
–0.159**
(0.077)
–0.140* 
   (0.084)
–0.174**
(0.078)
–0.158*
(0.089)
–0.266***
   (0.077)
GAPi,t–2
–0.149**
 (0.068)
–0.102 
(0.080)
–0.091  
(0.086)
DEBTi,t–1
0.028**
 (0.012)
0.039***
 (0.013)
0.038**
(0.016)
0.047***
   (0.015)
0.044***
(0.015)
0.048***
 (0.016)
0.034**
(0.014)
ir2010
–19.171***
 (0. 631)
–19.393***
   (0.792)
–19.751***  
(1.137)
–20.198***
  (0.879)
–20.184***
 (0.900)
–20.311***
 (1.080)
pob_o
8.257***
 (1.245)
grb_o
–0.241
(2.000)
esb_o
–1.101
(1.219)
ELEp
–0.523*
 (0.313)
–0.609*
 (0.325)
–0.532 
(0.359)
–0.644*
 (0.337)
–0.710**
(0.349)
ELE –0.479 (0.317)
–0.498*
 (0.246)
rltiri,t
rstiri,t
0.072**
 (0.031)
0.062 
(0.038)
year2010
–2.184 
 (0.662)
observations 243 243 243 243 243 243 243
period 2004–2012 2004–2012 2004–2012 2004–2012 2004–2012 2004–2012 2004–2012
Sargan test 
statistic 22.984 22.229 22.527 22.346 22.355 23.386 21.087
p-value 0.150 0.176 0.165 0.172 0.172 0.137 0.222
AR1-statsistic –2.335 –2.434 –2.356 –2.514 –2.554 –2.490 –2.129
p-value 0.020 0.015 0.019 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.033
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Moreover, to show the impact of the business cycle fluctuation on public fi-
nance, we introduced additional lags in the output gap. In Table 4, we include the 
additional lags in the output gap to evaluate their impact on the CAPB. This ap-
proach demonstrated the impact of lags in fiscal policy in reaction to the business 
cycle. The results of the estimations show that when we include additional lags, 
the impact of the output gap on the CAPB is not becoming important; moreover, 
using more lags in one specification is not adequate due to their statistically in-
significant impact on the CAPB.
In our equation, we employed lags in the FRI. This approach may be treated 
as an evaluation of the impact of multiyear fiscal frameworks on public finances. 
In many countries, fiscal rules are implemented in a budgetary process by using 
a top-down approach and the multiyear plans include about 3 years ahead. Ac-
cording to our results, the employed method of estimation shows the lack of a 
statistically significant impact of the lagged FRI on the CAPB. 
4. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the average influence of the fiscal rule index on fiscal variables 
over the 2000–2012 period in 27 EU countries. We checked the influence of fiscal 
constraints in sub-periods which include (i) the entire sample (2000–2012), (ii) 
the period after the first enlargement (2004–2012), and (iii) the period since the 
second enlargement (2007–2012), including the time of the crisis. 
This paper is based on the European Commission (2006, 2009) approach, but it 
is extended with a few elements. We used dynamic panel data, included the crisis 
period in our analysis, divided the whole sample into sub-periods, implemented a 
special dummy variable for the parliamentary elections, and employed a dummy 
Table 4. continued
CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB CAPB
I II III IV V VI VII
AR2-statistic –1.162 –0.944 –0.895 –0.443 –0.655 –0.246 0.104
p-value 0.245 0.345 0.371 0.658 0.512 0.806 0.917
instruments 
(no.) 26 25 27 24 25 27 25
Note: The robust standard error values are presented in parentheses. AR1 and AR2 denote the values of the sta-
tistic for the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. The Sargan statistic denotes the value of the Sargan test 
of over-identifying conditions, which value is computed using GMM-type of standard error. Signs *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Author’s own calculation.
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variable for Ireland in 2010. We also compared the results obtained for the cycli-
cally-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as a dependent variable, with the results 
for the cyclically-adjusted balance (CAB) as the dependent variable. 
We did not find a statistically significant influence of the FRI on the CAPB. 
However, the impact denotes the positive influence of fiscal constraints on the 
structural surplus. Thus, we decided to change the ranges of our samples. Af-
ter this, we found a positive and statistically significant influence of the FRI on 
both the CAPB and CAB since 2004. Thus, the enlargements have strengthened 
the impact of the rule index on public finance, probably as a consequence of 
the importance of the fulfilment of the fiscal convergence criteria and stronger 
governance in public finance. Moreover, in our robustness checks, the impact of 
FRI was statistically significant only in cases with the CAB as a dependent vari-
able (analysis based on full sample). But also we found that the lagged debt had 
a very low, but positive impact on the structural surplus. It should be pointed out 
that fiscal rules improve the public finance EU. On the other hand, the necessity 
of imposing institutional constraints on EU countries results from the Stability 
and Growth Pact and other arrangements. Therefore, the positive experience may 
strengthen the impact of institutions on outcomes.
According to our results, we should point out that the estimated impact is only 
the average impact of the FRI on structural surplus in relation to all EU countries. 
Our results show the growing importance of institutional constraints in the EU. It 
is consistent with the European Commission guidelines for fiscal policy, which 
should be based on specific numerical limitations.
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